India’s Defence Modernization Roadmap: Building Power for a Two-Front Era

Executive Summary

India’s military modernization is entering its most demanding phase since the nuclear tests of 1998. The country is no longer preparing primarily for a limited conventional war with Pakistan. It must now deter a nuclear-armed Pakistan, manage a militarized Line of Actual Control with China, protect an expanding maritime sphere in the Indian Ocean, defend space and cyber infrastructure, and sustain the industrial foundations of prolonged high-technology conflict.

The strategic environment has shifted faster than India’s inherited force structure. China’s military transformation has produced long-range precision weapons, integrated air defence, fifth-generation aircraft, a rapidly expanding navy, counter-space systems and theatre-level joint commands. Pakistan remains conventionally weaker than India but retains nuclear weapons, Chinese equipment, ballistic and cruise missiles, armed drones, and a long history of supporting cross-border terrorism.

The possibility of coordinated pressure from China and Pakistan is no longer treated as an abstract planning exercise. Their defence relationship includes the JF-17 combat aircraft, submarines, air-defence systems, unmanned platforms, satellites and intelligence cooperation. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor also gives Beijing a deeper strategic stake in Pakistan and access to infrastructure extending toward the Arabian Sea.

India’s response combines military acquisition with institutional and industrial reform. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has expanded capital expenditure, reserved a large share of procurement for domestic companies, corporatized the former Ordnance Factory Board, promoted private-sector participation and used Positive Indigenisation Lists to reduce selected imports. The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, Innovations for Defence Excellence and the Technology Development Fund seek to connect the armed forces with start-ups, universities and private manufacturers.

The Union Budget for 2026-27 allocated ₹7.85 lakh crore to the Ministry of Defence, a 15.19 percent increase over the previous year’s budget estimate. More than ₹2.19 lakh crore was assigned under the capital head, including approximately ₹1.85 lakh crore for capital acquisition. Around 75 percent of the acquisition budget - ₹1.39 lakh crore - was reserved for domestic industry. The Defence Research and Development Organisation received ₹29,100.25 crore.

These figures mark a serious expansion of resources, but the budget also exposes structural pressure. Defence pensions exceed ₹1.71 lakh crore. Salaries, allowances, maintenance and operational expenditure consume another large share. India must simultaneously fund current readiness, support a large standing military, replace ageing systems and invest in emerging technology.

The modernization roadmap rests on six operational pillars:

Restructuring the armed forces for joint theatre warfare.
Restoring combat-aircraft strength and developing an indigenous aerospace ecosystem.
Building a sea-control and sea-denial force for the Indian Ocean.
Expanding precision strike, air defence, drone and counter-drone capabilities.
Securing India’s nuclear deterrent, space architecture and military networks.
Creating an industrial base capable of sustained production during war.

The Indian Army is moving toward lighter, more mobile and technologically networked formations, especially along the Himalayan frontier. The Navy is commissioning indigenous destroyers, frigates and submarines while developing carrier aviation, nuclear-powered platforms and long-range maritime surveillance. The Air Force is attempting to manage declining squadron strength while inducting the Tejas, upgrading the Su-30MKI fleet, integrating Rafale fighters and supporting development of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft.

India has also acquired 31 MQ-9B remotely piloted aircraft from the United States and signed a 2025 agreement with France for 26 Rafale Marine aircraft. Indigenous programmes include the Tejas Mk1A and Mk2, AMCA, Zorawar light tank, Pinaka rocket system, Akash air defence, BrahMos cruise missile, Project Kusha, indigenous artillery and a growing family of unmanned platforms.

Modernization is nevertheless constrained by delay. The Tejas Mk1A schedule has been affected by engine-supply and integration problems. Project 75(I) for conventional submarines has moved slowly. Theatre-command reform remains politically and institutionally sensitive. India still depends on foreign suppliers for aero engines, certain sensors, submarine technologies, high-end electronics and specialised materials.

The central danger is not that India lacks programmes. It is that too many programmes mature late, in small numbers or without the joint command, logistics and data architecture required to convert platforms into combat power.

India’s defence challenge is no longer the absence of ambition. It is the conversion of ambition into scale, speed, interoperability and wartime endurance.

The roadmap through the 2030s must therefore prioritise operational outcomes rather than procurement symbolism. India needs combat-ready squadrons, deployable brigades, submarine availability, protected satellites, large ammunition reserves, resilient supply chains and commanders capable of combining all domains in real time.

Background

From Continental Defence to Multi-Domain Competition

India’s military institutions were shaped by the experience of partition, the wars of 1947-48, 1962, 1965 and 1971, the Kargil conflict of 1999, and decades of cross-border terrorism. The country developed a large manpower-intensive military designed to defend long land borders and respond to conflict with Pakistan.

The 1962 war with China left a lasting strategic scar. India expanded mountain formations and border infrastructure, but for decades the Chinese frontier remained relatively quiet compared with the Line of Control with Pakistan. New Delhi assumed that political agreements and confidence-building mechanisms would prevent local disputes from escalating into sustained military confrontation.

That assumption weakened through repeated standoffs at Depsang, Chumar and Doklam. It collapsed after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, in which Indian and Chinese soldiers were killed during brutal hand-to-hand fighting. Both countries subsequently deployed large forces, artillery, armour, air defence and aircraft across the Himalayan theatre.

The border crisis transformed India’s planning. The People’s Liberation Army was no longer a distant long-term benchmark. It had become an immediate operational competitor capable of mobilising forces through modern roads, railways, airfields and logistics hubs on the Tibetan plateau.

Pakistan remained active throughout this shift. Its military preserved a force posture centred on India while expanding tactical nuclear capabilities, cruise missiles, drones and Chinese-supplied aircraft. Terrorist organisations operating from Pakistani territory continued to create the risk of rapid escalation.

India’s maritime environment changed at the same time. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, expanded access to ports across the Indian Ocean and deployed submarines and survey vessels into waters close to India. Chinese investment in Gwadar, Hambantota and other infrastructure generated concern about dual-use logistics and long-term naval access.

India therefore moved from a primarily continental security model toward a multi-domain framework. The Army still requires mass and readiness along two disputed borders, but the Navy must monitor an ocean spanning the Strait of Hormuz, the approaches to the Malacca Strait and the eastern coast of Africa. The Air Force must support both theatres while defending national airspace, strategic infrastructure and nuclear forces.

The Legacy of Import Dependence

India’s armed forces historically relied on foreign platforms from a diverse range of suppliers. The Soviet Union and later Russia supplied combat aircraft, tanks, submarines, helicopters, missiles and warships. France provided Mirage fighters, submarines and other systems. Israel became a major source of drones, radars, sensors, precision weapons and air-defence technology. The United States emerged as an important supplier of transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and unmanned systems.

This diversification reduced dependence on any single power but created logistical complexity. Different fleets require separate maintenance chains, weapons, training systems and software environments. Wartime availability can depend on foreign spare parts, export approvals and geopolitical conditions.

Russia’s war against Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of legacy supply chains. Russia remains a significant Indian defence partner and continues to support systems such as the Su-30MKI, T-90, S-400 and BrahMos. Yet Russian industry faces wartime demand, sanctions and production constraints. India cannot assume that every component will remain available during a simultaneous Asian crisis.

Western systems also create dependencies. The Tejas Mk1A relies on the American GE F404 engine. Delays in engine deliveries affected aircraft production. The next generation of Indian fighters will require access to advanced propulsion, materials, electronic warfare and manufacturing technologies that no foreign partner will transfer without limits.

Self-reliance does not mean producing every bolt domestically. It means ensuring that India can operate, repair, replenish and upgrade critical systems during sustained conflict without depending on the political permission of another state.

The Kargil Reform Process

The 1999 Kargil conflict exposed serious weaknesses in intelligence coordination, surveillance and joint operations. The Kargil Review Committee and subsequent Group of Ministers recommended changes to national-security management.

Several reforms followed, but the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff took two decades. General Bipin Rawat became India’s first CDS in 2020 and headed the newly established Department of Military Affairs. The position was designed to promote jointness, prioritise procurement and restructure the armed forces into integrated theatre commands.

General Rawat’s death in a helicopter crash in December 2021 interrupted the process. General Anil Chauhan became CDS in 2022 and continued work on joint structures. The services have since developed common logistics nodes, joint doctrines and plans for reorganised theatre commands.

Full implementation has remained slower than originally expected. The Army, Navy and Air Force differ over command boundaries, control of scarce air assets, force-generation responsibilities and the relationship between service chiefs and theatre commanders.

The debate is legitimate. India should not copy the American or Chinese command model mechanically. Its system must reflect geography, civil-military arrangements, nuclear command, available assets and the distinct demands of continental and maritime warfare. Yet delay also carries a cost. China already operates through theatre commands, including the Western Theatre Command responsible for the Indian frontier.

Aatmanirbhar Bharat and Industrial Reform

The Modi government made defence manufacturing a central component of Aatmanirbhar Bharat. The policy aims to reduce imports, retain expenditure inside India, create skilled employment, expand exports and build strategic autonomy.

The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 prioritised Indian design and production through procurement categories favouring domestic content. Positive Indigenisation Lists identified systems and components that would no longer be imported after specified dates. The SRIJAN portal connected domestic suppliers with requirements previously met from abroad.

The former Ordnance Factory Board was corporatized into seven defence public-sector companies in 2021. The reform sought to improve accountability, efficiency, cost control and responsiveness to users. Private firms including Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen and Toubro, Bharat Forge, Mahindra Defence and Adani Defence expanded their role alongside Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bharat Electronics Limited, Bharat Dynamics Limited and other public enterprises.

Defence production rose to approximately ₹1.78 lakh crore in financial year 2025-26. Exports reached a record ₹38,424 crore, up 62.66 percent from ₹23,622 crore in the previous year. Public-sector companies contributed ₹21,071 crore, while private firms contributed ₹17,353 crore. Indian defence products reached more than 80 countries.

The export increase demonstrates improving industrial capacity, but export value alone does not prove technological independence. India exports components, protective equipment, patrol vessels, artillery systems, radars, missiles and aerospace structures while continuing to import several high-end technologies. The next stage must move from manufacturing participation to design authority and control of critical intellectual property.

Current Situation

The 2026-27 Defence Budget

The ₹7.85 lakh crore allocation for 2026-27 is the largest assigned to any central government ministry. It accounts for 14.67 percent of total central expenditure and represents a major nominal increase from the previous year.

Approximately 27.95 percent of the defence allocation is assigned to capital expenditure. Revenue spending on operational sustenance accounts for another significant share, while pay, allowances and pensions together consume almost half the budget.

The capital allocation of more than ₹2.19 lakh crore is 21.84 percent higher than the 2025-26 budget estimate. Approximately ₹1.85 lakh crore is earmarked for acquisitions, allowing the services to finance aircraft, warships, submarines, drones, weapons and communications systems.

The domestic procurement reservation of ₹1.39 lakh crore creates a large guaranteed market for Indian manufacturers. Predictability matters because companies will not invest in production lines, research and skilled labour without confidence that orders will continue beyond a single contract.

DRDO’s ₹29,100.25 crore allocation supports laboratories, prototypes and advanced research. Around 25 percent of the defence research budget has been opened to industry, start-ups and academia. By March 2026, iDEX had engaged 676 start-ups, micro, small and medium enterprises and innovators, with 551 design-and-development contracts signed.

The budget is moving in the correct direction, but India’s economic scale must be considered. Defence expenditure remains below the levels that a simultaneous land, maritime, air, cyber and space competition with China could eventually demand. New Delhi must avoid measuring readiness only through year-on-year budget growth.

Operation Sindoor and the New Combat Environment

The April 2025 terrorist attack at Pahalgam killed 26 people and triggered another India-Pakistan crisis. India launched Operation Sindoor in May, striking what it described as terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered territory. Pakistan retaliated, and the confrontation expanded into drone, missile, artillery and air operations before military action ceased on 10 May.

The episode offered a compressed view of modern South Asian conflict. Unmanned systems, electronic warfare, long-range precision weapons, air defence, satellite information and information operations became central. Both sides attempted to control escalation while demonstrating the capacity to strike beyond the immediate border.

Public claims concerning aircraft losses and the performance of individual systems were heavily contested. Strategic analysis should avoid turning wartime narratives into verified technical conclusions. The broader lesson is more durable: future India-Pakistan conflict will not resemble the massed land campaigns of 1965 or 1971.

India requires persistent surveillance, distributed air defence, protected command networks, accurate battle-damage assessment and the ability to launch calibrated strikes without exposing high-value aircraft unnecessarily. Cheap drones can reveal radar positions, saturate defences or impose disproportionate interceptor costs.

Operation Sindoor also demonstrated that Chinese-origin systems in Pakistani service are now operational factors rather than export-market abstractions. India must prepare to face Chinese sensors, aircraft, air-defence systems, weapons and data links through Pakistan even in a conflict where China is not a declared participant.

The Northern Border

India and China reached arrangements for disengagement at several friction points, but the broader military competition along the Line of Actual Control remains. The infrastructure and force levels created after 2020 will not disappear quickly.

India accelerated roads, tunnels, bridges, ammunition storage and advanced landing grounds. The Border Roads Organisation received ₹7,394 crore in capital funding for 2026-27. Projects such as the Atal Tunnel, Sela Tunnel and expanded frontier roads improve mobility, reinforcement and civilian connectivity.

Infrastructure narrows the historical advantage enjoyed by China on the Tibetan plateau, but roads alone cannot solve the Himalayan challenge. India requires resilient logistics, high-altitude artillery, helicopters, drones, air defence, secure communications and forces acclimatised for prolonged deployment.

The Zorawar light-tank programme emerged from the requirement for mobile armoured firepower at high altitude. Developed by DRDO with Larsen and Toubro, the platform is designed to be lighter and more deployable than India’s T-90 and Arjun tanks. Trials and protection requirements will determine its induction schedule.

The Army is also expanding surveillance and precision fires through drones, loitering munitions, Pinaka rockets, BrahMos missiles and modern artillery. The challenge is integrating these systems into a network capable of locating, prioritising and striking targets before they relocate.

Army Modernization

The Indian Army remains one of the world’s largest standing land forces. Its modernization must balance high-altitude confrontation with China, conventional deterrence against Pakistan, counterterrorism, internal security assistance and United Nations deployments.

Its artillery renewal has advanced after decades of delay. The M777 lightweight howitzer supports mountain operations. The K9 Vajra-T provides tracked firepower. The indigenous Dhanush and Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System expand domestic production. Pinaka provides increasingly long-range rocket artillery.

The strategic direction should be clear: artillery must evolve from an area-fire arm into a sensor-linked precision-strike network. Counter-battery radars, drones, satellite imagery and ground sensors should feed firing units through secure digital command systems.

Armoured-force modernization presents a different problem. The T-72 fleet is ageing, while the T-90 remains central to India’s mechanised force. The Arjun Mk1A adds an indigenous heavy platform but has faced weight, logistics and fleet-standardisation concerns. The Future Ready Combat Vehicle programme is intended to replace older tanks over time.

Infantry modernization includes the AK-203 rifle, SIG716 rifles, body armour, night-vision systems, communications and battlefield-management tools. Progress has been uneven because India must equip a very large force. Elite units can receive advanced equipment quickly, but modernization must reach ordinary battalions to alter battlefield performance.

The Army’s Agnipath recruitment model seeks to create a younger force and reduce long-term pension pressure by inducting personnel known as Agniveers for limited service, with a portion retained. The scheme has generated political debate over experience, cohesion, post-service employment and the appropriate balance between short-service and career personnel.

Financial logic cannot be the sole criterion. Military manpower policy must be judged by combat effectiveness, technical specialisation, unit cohesion and mobilisation capacity. Modern weapons often require years of training. Cyber, air-defence, intelligence, engineering and maintenance roles cannot be treated as interchangeable short-term labour.

Air-Power Modernization

The Indian Air Force faces the sharpest near-term capability gap. Its authorised strength has traditionally been described as 42 fighter squadrons, but actual strength has remained significantly lower. The retirement of ageing MiG-21 aircraft intensified pressure.

The fighter fleet includes Su-30MKI aircraft, Rafales, Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s, Jaguars and Tejas variants. Each contributes different capabilities, but fleet diversity complicates logistics and weapons integration.

The Su-30MKI will remain the numerical backbone. Planned upgrades are expected to improve radars, electronic warfare, weapons, mission computers and survivability. The aircraft’s range and payload make it valuable for air superiority, maritime operations and long-range strike.

The 36 Rafales acquired from France provide advanced sensors, electronic warfare and precision weapons. Their performance and commonality influenced the Navy’s decision to acquire 26 Rafale Marine aircraft for carrier operations under a 2025 agreement valued at approximately $7.4 billion.

The Tejas programme is strategically indispensable because India cannot sustain a large combat fleet through imported aircraft alone. The Tejas Mk1A includes an active electronically scanned array radar, improved electronic warfare and greater maintainability. The Air Force ordered 83 aircraft, and additional numbers are intended to replace retiring fighters.

Production delays exposed India’s dependence on imported GE F404 engines and the limited tolerance built into the supply chain. HAL must expand output, but engine availability, certification, software integration and supplier quality all influence delivery.

The Tejas Mk2 is intended to become a larger medium-weight fighter capable of replacing Mirage 2000, Jaguar and MiG-29 fleets. The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft is planned as a fifth-generation stealth platform. In May 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved an AMCA execution model allowing participation by public and private industry through competitive partnership.

The decision is strategically sound. India cannot allow a single company to carry the entire combat-aircraft ecosystem. Private firms need real design, integration and manufacturing responsibility rather than peripheral work packages.

AMCA timelines must remain realistic. Stealth shaping, internal weapons bays, advanced flight controls, sensor fusion, low-observable materials and propulsion integration make fifth-generation aircraft exceptionally difficult. The first version may rely on a foreign engine before a more powerful indigenous or jointly developed engine becomes available.

India must avoid waiting for a perfect future platform while current squadron strength declines. The roadmap needs three parallel tracks:

Accelerated Tejas Mk1A production and Su-30MKI upgrades.
Timely Tejas Mk2 development and a bridging multirole acquisition if required.
Protected long-term funding for AMCA, engines and unmanned combat aircraft.

Air power also depends on force multipliers. India needs more airborne early-warning aircraft, aerial refuellers, electronic-intelligence systems and long-range stand-off weapons. Fighter numbers alone do not determine air superiority.

Air and Missile Defence

India faces threats ranging from small drones and cruise missiles to ballistic missiles and combat aircraft. No single system can defend such a spectrum.

The S-400 provides long-range engagement capacity and contributes to area defence against aircraft and selected missile threats. Indigenous Akash systems cover shorter ranges, while the Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile developed with Israel adds another layer.

India’s ballistic-missile defence programme and Project Kusha are intended to strengthen protection against high-altitude and long-range threats. The Integrated Air Command and Control System connects sensors and weapons across the country.

The lesson from Ukraine, the Red Sea and the Iran-Israel wars is that interceptor economics matter. An advanced missile should not be used against every low-cost drone. India requires guns, electronic warfare, directed-energy research, low-cost interceptors and mobile counter-drone systems beneath its more expensive air-defence layers.

Air bases, ammunition depots, nuclear command facilities, ports, data centres, refineries and political centres cannot all receive equal protection. Strategic prioritisation, dispersal, hardened shelters, deception and rapid repair are essential.

Naval Modernization and the Indian Ocean

The Indian Navy is the service through which India can exert influence beyond its immediate borders. The Indian Ocean carries energy supplies, container traffic and undersea communications connecting the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Asia. India’s geography gives it a central position astride these routes.

The Navy operates the aircraft carriers INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant. Vikrant’s indigenous construction was a major industrial achievement, demonstrating India’s ability to design and build a complex capital ship.

The Rafale Marine acquisition will provide a modern carrier fighter while India develops the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter. Carrier aviation gives India mobile air power, surveillance and fleet defence. Yet carriers are expensive and vulnerable without escorts, submarines, airborne early warning and robust logistics.

India’s surface fleet is being renewed through Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, Nilgiri-class frigates, Kamorta-class anti-submarine corvettes and other indigenous vessels. Indian shipyards have developed meaningful design and construction capability, with progressively higher domestic content.

The submarine arm remains a critical concern. Six Kalvari-class submarines built under Project 75 improved capability, but older Kilo and Shishumar-class boats face ageing pressures. Project 75(I), intended to acquire six conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion and substantial domestic participation, has been delayed by complex requirements and negotiations.

China’s expanding submarine fleet makes delay increasingly expensive. India needs conventional submarines for operations in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, nuclear attack submarines for endurance and escort missions, and ballistic-missile submarines for strategic deterrence.

The government approved progress toward indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarines, a programme that will require sustained investment in reactor design, quieting, sensors and weapons. These boats would provide high endurance for monitoring Chinese deployments and protecting carrier and deterrent forces.

The nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines INS Arihant and INS Arighaat strengthen India’s sea-based deterrent. Survivable submarine-launched missiles reduce the risk that an adversary could neutralise India’s nuclear forces in a first strike.

Maritime-domain awareness is expanding through P-8I aircraft, MH-60R helicopters, satellites, coastal radars, information-sharing agreements and the planned MQ-9B SeaGuardian fleet. The Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region supports cooperation with partner states.

The Andaman and Nicobar Command has exceptional strategic value. The islands sit near the western approaches to the Malacca Strait. Airfields, surveillance systems, missiles and logistics infrastructure there can monitor traffic between the Pacific and Indian oceans.

India should strengthen the islands without assuming that geography creates an automatic blockade capability. Sustained operations would require hardened bases, fuel, air defence, submarines, aircraft and protection against long-range Chinese missiles.

Drones, Autonomy and Electronic Warfare

Unmanned systems have moved from specialised tools to mass battlefield assets. Ukraine demonstrated the value of commercial quadcopters, first-person-view attack drones, maritime drones and long-range one-way systems. Operation Sindoor reinforced the relevance of drones and counter-drone defences in South Asia.

India’s acquisition of 31 MQ-9B aircraft provides long-endurance surveillance and precision-strike capacity across land and maritime theatres. The fleet is divided among the three services and improves coverage of the Indian Ocean and frontier regions.

Imported high-end drones should complement, not displace, indigenous development. India needs expendable systems that can be produced in thousands, not merely exquisite platforms available in small numbers. Swarming drones, loitering munitions, autonomous underwater vehicles and collaborative combat aircraft will shape future force design.

Electronic warfare is equally important. Drones depend on communications, navigation and data links that can be jammed or deceived. Forces must operate under degraded satellite navigation and contested electromagnetic conditions.

The modernization roadmap should treat software, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare as weapons rather than support services. Procurement systems built around physical platforms are poorly suited to capabilities that require constant updates.

Space, Cyber and Information Warfare

India’s military relies increasingly on satellites for communication, navigation, surveillance, missile warning and maritime awareness. The Defence Space Agency and Defence Cyber Agency were established to coordinate activity beyond traditional service boundaries.

Mission Shakti in 2019 demonstrated an anti-satellite capability. The test signalled that India could threaten space assets if deterrence failed. Yet destructive anti-satellite weapons create debris and may be less useful than reversible electronic or cyber effects.

China possesses a broad counter-space programme including direct-ascent missiles, jamming, cyber capabilities and rendezvous systems. Pakistan benefits from Chinese satellite services. India must assume that its military satellites will be targeted during major conflict.

Resilience requires proliferated satellites, rapid launch, protected communications, ground-station redundancy and the ability to operate when space support is degraded. Private Indian space companies can contribute launch systems, imagery, communications and satellite manufacturing.

Cyber warfare will target power grids, railways, financial systems, telecommunications and military networks. Defence cannot be isolated from national infrastructure. Cooperation among the armed forces, intelligence agencies, civilian ministries and private operators is essential.

Information warfare also shapes crisis control. False claims, manipulated imagery and selective disclosure can compress political decision time. India needs credible communication, rapid declassification procedures and disciplined public messaging. Propaganda should not replace accurate battle-damage assessment.

Nuclear Modernization

India’s declared nuclear doctrine rests on credible minimum deterrence and no first use, with massive retaliation promised following a nuclear attack. The doctrine also reserves a response option to major chemical or biological attack.

China and Pakistan create different deterrence problems. China possesses a much larger and expanding nuclear arsenal with intercontinental systems, ballistic-missile submarines and sophisticated command networks. Pakistan maintains a smaller arsenal oriented primarily toward India and includes short-range systems intended to deter conventional operations.

India is modernizing land, air and sea-based nuclear forces. The Agni missile family provides ranges covering regional and wider strategic targets. The 2024 Mission Divyastra test demonstrated multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle technology on the Agni-V platform.

MIRVs can strengthen penetration and complicate missile defence, but they also create pressure on command, surveillance and stockpile management. India must maintain strict civilian control, secure communications and reliable early warning.

The sea-based deterrent requires more than submarines and missiles. It needs quiet patrol areas, secure communication with national leadership, trained crews and protection from enemy anti-submarine warfare. As Chinese naval activity expands in the Indian Ocean, preserving SSBN survivability will become more demanding.

India should preserve doctrinal clarity while modernizing delivery systems. Ambiguity can support deterrence in some contexts, but uncontrolled speculation about abandoning no first use may create instability without generating additional capability.

Strategic Analysis

The Two-Front Problem

A simultaneous full-scale war with China and Pakistan remains unlikely, but coordinated coercion is plausible. Pakistan could increase pressure along the Line of Control or activate terrorist networks during an India-China crisis. China could provide intelligence, equipment and diplomatic support without formally entering a Pakistan-led confrontation.

India should therefore plan for a primary front and an opportunistic secondary front rather than assuming two identical conventional wars. The required force posture emphasises mobility, reserves, air power, long-range fires and joint intelligence.

China is the pacing challenge because it possesses the greater economic, technological and military capacity. Pakistan remains the more frequent trigger because terrorism and short-warning crises create pressure for rapid retaliation.

This combination is dangerous. India must maintain sufficient force against Pakistan without allowing the western front to absorb resources required for long-term competition with China.

Joint Theatre Commands

Theatre commands should integrate Army, Navy and Air Force assets under commanders responsible for defined operational areas. Potential structures have included northern, western and maritime commands, supported by functional organisations for air defence, logistics, cyber and space.

The Air Force has legitimate concerns about fragmenting scarce aircraft among geographic commands. Air power is inherently flexible and may need to shift rapidly between fronts. The solution is not to preserve service silos but to design a joint allocation system that retains central flexibility while giving theatre commanders access to required effects.

Theatre reform must separate force generation from force employment. Service headquarters should recruit, train, equip and sustain forces. Theatre commanders should plan and conduct operations using assigned capabilities.

India also needs an integrated planning process connecting political objectives with military campaigns. Jointness is not achieved by changing reporting lines alone. Common data standards, communications, logistics and doctrine matter more than organisational diagrams.

The Procurement Trap

Indian defence procurement has often produced long competitions, changing requirements, legal disputes and small orders. By the time a system is contracted, technology may have evolved and costs may have increased.

The armed forces sometimes seek the best available global specifications while domestic industry requires stable, achievable requirements. Repeated changes create delay and discourage investment. Conversely, accepting immature systems solely because they are indigenous can reduce operational readiness.

A better model would use spiral development. The services should induct viable systems in blocks, provide feedback and fund upgrades. This approach builds production capacity while technology matures.

India must also order at meaningful scale. Production lines become efficient only when manufacturers can spread investment across sustained demand. Small purchases increase unit costs and make exports difficult.

The Aero-Engine Constraint

Combat-aircraft propulsion is India’s most serious technological dependency. The Kaveri programme did not produce an engine suitable for the original Tejas requirement, though its technologies continue to support other applications.

Foreign partnership is necessary, but co-production should not be confused with design sovereignty. India needs knowledge of hot-section materials, single-crystal blades, coatings, combustion, testing and digital engine control.

Engine development requires decades of sustained funding and tolerance for failure. The government should treat it as national infrastructure comparable to the nuclear and space programmes. Without propulsion autonomy, every future fighter, unmanned combat aircraft and cruise missile programme remains exposed.

War Reserves and Industrial Mobilisation

Modern conflict consumes missiles, shells, drones and spare parts at rates far above peacetime planning. India cannot assume that foreign suppliers will replenish stocks during a crisis involving China.

War-wastage reserves should be connected to surge-production contracts. Companies need pre-negotiated arrangements for expanding output, access to materials and protected electricity and transport.

Critical production should be geographically distributed. Concentrated factories are vulnerable to missile or cyberattack. Secure data, alternative suppliers and repair capacity matter as much as headline manufacturing figures.

India’s pharmaceutical, automotive, electronics and software sectors provide a broad industrial foundation. Defence planners must learn how to mobilise civilian capacity without waiting for war.

Quality, Accountability and User Confidence

Self-reliance will fail if the armed forces view indigenous equipment as politically protected from criticism. Soldiers, sailors and aircrew must be able to report defects honestly. Manufacturers must be accountable for delivery, maintenance and reliability.

At the same time, the services must accept responsibility for supporting domestic systems through early difficulties. No major military-industrial power achieved autonomy by importing whenever local development encountered setbacks.

The correct relationship is demanding partnership: realistic specifications, transparent trials, firm schedules, assured orders and continuous improvement.

Global Impact

China and the Indo-Pacific Balance

India’s modernization forces China to allocate attention and resources to its western frontier and the Indian Ocean. A capable India complicates Beijing’s ability to concentrate exclusively on Taiwan, the South China Sea and the western Pacific.

India does not seek a formal alliance against China. Its strategic autonomy remains central. Yet cooperation through the QUAD with the United States, Japan and Australia improves maritime awareness, logistics, exercises and diplomatic coordination.

AUKUS affects India indirectly by strengthening allied undersea and technological capacity in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi will not join the pact, but it can benefit from a regional balance that limits unilateral Chinese dominance.

Global Chanakya’s China, Xi Jinping, Taiwan, South China Sea, QUAD and AUKUS pages provide the wider strategic environment in which India’s military choices must be understood.

Pakistan

Indian modernization will push Pakistan toward deeper reliance on China, nuclear deterrence, drones, missiles and asymmetric warfare. Islamabad cannot match India platform for platform without imposing severe economic costs.

Pakistan will seek capabilities that bypass Indian conventional strength. These include tactical nuclear weapons, long-range precision missiles, submarines, cyber operations and support for deniable armed groups.

India must avoid creating a strategy in which every terrorist attack automatically produces an escalatory sequence controlled by the adversary. Intelligence, covert action, financial pressure, border security and calibrated military force should remain part of a wider toolkit.

Russia

Russia will remain a significant partner because of legacy fleets, BrahMos cooperation, nuclear-submarine experience and strategic history. India is unlikely to abandon Russian systems abruptly.

New Delhi will nevertheless diversify. The war in Ukraine and Russia’s growing relationship with China reduce the wisdom of excessive dependence. India’s objective should be to preserve useful cooperation while acquiring source access, localisation and alternative supply chains.

Global Chanakya’s Russia and Vladimir Putin intelligence pages should be linked to analysis of India’s procurement diversification and the future of the Russia-India strategic relationship.

The United States

India-U.S. defence relations have expanded through the LEMOA logistics agreement, COMCASA communications framework and BECA geospatial accord. India operates American-origin P-8I aircraft, C-17 and C-130J transports, Apache helicopters, Chinooks and MH-60R naval helicopters, with MQ-9B aircraft to follow.

Cooperation provides access to advanced systems, exercises and intelligence. It also creates exposure to American export controls and political conditions. India will resist alliance obligations and preserve independent policy toward Russia, Iran and other partners.

Washington views India as a critical balancing power in the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi views the United States as an essential technology and security partner but not a treaty guarantor.

France and Israel

France is one of India’s most trusted defence partners. Cooperation spans Rafale aircraft, Scorpene submarines, space, maritime security and potential engine technology. France’s Indo-Pacific territories and preference for strategic autonomy align with Indian thinking.

Israel provides drones, radars, missiles, electronic warfare and agricultural and technological cooperation. The relationship is operationally valuable because Israeli companies have often adapted systems quickly to Indian requirements.

India will preserve these partnerships while pressing for greater local production and technology access.

Defence Exports and Global South Diplomacy

The BrahMos export to the Philippines marked a major breakthrough. The system gives Manila a coastal anti-ship capability relevant to pressure in the South China Sea. India has also exported artillery, patrol platforms, radars, protective equipment and components.

Defence exports strengthen diplomacy when they include training, maintenance and long-term support. They can deepen India’s relationships across Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

Export success will depend on reliability, financing, after-sales service and production capacity. India cannot build credibility if domestic orders consume all available output or deliveries are delayed.

Risk Assessment

Risk One: Capability Arrives Too Late

China’s military modernization is already mature in several domains. Delays to fighters, submarines, engines and theatre commands could leave India with a dangerous capability gap during the late 2020s.

Probability: High.

Impact: Very high.

Risk Two: Budget Growth Without Combat Power

Higher allocations may be absorbed by pensions, salaries, inflation and delayed contracts. Expenditure can rise without producing proportional readiness.

Probability: Medium to high.

Impact: High.

Risk Three: Two-Front Coercion

China and Pakistan may coordinate political, intelligence or military pressure during a crisis without launching simultaneous full-scale wars.

Probability: Medium.

Impact: Very high.

Risk Four: Foreign Technology Denial

Sanctions, export controls, war or supply-chain disruption could affect engines, electronics, spares and specialised materials.

Probability: Medium.

Impact: High.

Risk Five: Drone Saturation

Low-cost drones could overwhelm expensive air-defence systems and expose command posts, artillery and logistics.

Probability: High.

Impact: High.

Risk Six: Organisational Resistance

Service competition may dilute theatre-command reform and preserve separate procurement, communications and logistics structures.

Probability: Medium to high.

Impact: High.

Risk Seven: Industrial Concentration

Excessive dependence on a small number of public or private companies could create bottlenecks and reduce competitive pressure.

Probability: Medium.

Impact: Medium to high.

Risk Eight: Nuclear Escalation

A conventional India-Pakistan conflict could cross nuclear thresholds through misperception, attacks on dual-use systems or fear of pre-emption.

Probability: Low to medium.

Impact: Extreme.

Future Scenarios

Scenario Analysis One: Integrated Indigenous Power by 2035

India operationalises theatre commands, accelerates Tejas production, fields Tejas Mk2 and begins AMCA induction. The Navy expands submarine numbers and commissions indigenous nuclear attack submarines. Drone and space networks connect forces across both fronts.

Domestic companies control key sensors, weapons, software and maintenance. Defence exports grow alongside wartime production capacity. India becomes capable of denying China easy military gains while preserving escalation dominance against Pakistan.

Scenario Analysis Two: Selective Modernization

India inducts advanced platforms but in insufficient numbers. Elite formations become highly capable while much of the force remains dependent on ageing equipment and fragmented networks.

The Navy and missile forces progress, but fighter strength and submarine availability remain below requirements. India can manage limited crises but faces strain during prolonged two-front pressure.

This is the most plausible trajectory without deeper procurement and organisational reform.

Scenario Analysis Three: Emergency Import Cycle

Delays create an urgent capability gap. India launches large foreign purchases of fighters, drones, submarines and air-defence systems. Readiness improves quickly, but domestic programmes lose orders and strategic dependence persists.

This scenario may be operationally necessary in selected areas, but repeated emergency imports would undermine the industrial roadmap.

Scenario Analysis Four: Himalayan Crisis

A new Line of Actual Control confrontation expands beyond local patrol clashes. Both sides employ drones, electronic warfare, artillery and cyber operations. Pakistan increases pressure along the western front.

India’s infrastructure and precision fires perform better than in 2020, but airlift, ammunition and integrated command become decisive. The crisis accelerates theatre-command reform and domestic production.

Scenario Analysis Five: Indian Ocean Competition

Chinese naval deployments become permanent, supported by logistics access across the region. India responds with submarines, maritime aircraft, long-range missiles and partnerships through the QUAD and Indian Ocean states.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands become a major surveillance and denial hub. Undersea competition emerges as the central test of Indian maritime power.

Intelligence Forecast

India’s defence budget will remain on an upward trajectory, with capital acquisition and domestic procurement receiving political priority. Fiscal pressure from pensions and personnel costs will continue driving manpower reform.

Theatre commands are likely to progress through phased implementation rather than a single dramatic reorganisation. Joint logistics, communications and planning will mature before every command relationship is settled.

The Air Force will remain the most stressed service through the late 2020s. Tejas Mk1A production, engine deliveries and Su-30MKI upgrades will be watched as indicators of whether the squadron decline can be stabilised.

AMCA will remain protected as a national strategic programme, but operational induction is unlikely to solve immediate fighter shortages. Engine development will become a defining test of India’s technological autonomy.

The Navy will continue receiving the largest proportional benefits from indigenous design and shipbuilding. Submarine numbers, rather than surface-ship launches alone, will determine the credibility of maritime modernization.

India will accelerate procurement of drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and counter-unmanned systems after lessons from Operation Sindoor and other contemporary conflicts.

Long-range precision fires will expand across the services. BrahMos variants, Pinaka rockets, Pralay missiles and air-launched weapons will support a doctrine of calibrated conventional response.

Defence cooperation with the United States, France and Israel will deepen, while Russian-origin fleets will remain operationally significant. India will pursue diversification without formal alliance dependence.

Defence exports will continue growing, though the extraordinary 2025-26 rate may not repeat every year. Missiles, artillery, radars, naval platforms and aerospace components offer the strongest prospects.

The nuclear submarine programme will receive sustained funding because sea-based deterrence and Chinese naval activity converge as strategic priorities.

China will remain the principal long-term benchmark. Pakistan will remain the most likely source of sudden military crisis. India’s roadmap will be judged by whether it can prepare for one without becoming vulnerable to the other.

Final Strategic Takeaway

India is not modernizing for prestige. It is modernizing because the military balance around it is becoming less forgiving.

China possesses greater industrial scale, a larger defence budget and an increasingly mature system of joint warfare. Pakistan combines nuclear weapons, Chinese technology and asymmetric strategy. The Indian Ocean is no longer protected by distance. Space, cyber networks and civilian infrastructure have become part of the battlefield.

New Delhi has responded with higher expenditure, indigenous production, missile development, naval expansion and closer partnerships. The direction is credible. The pace remains uneven.

The strongest programmes share common features: stable political support, clear operational demand, sustained orders and close cooperation among users, scientists and manufacturers. India’s missile and naval achievements show what is possible. Delays in fighters, engines and submarines show what happens when responsibility is fragmented and timelines slip.

A successful roadmap must resist two temptations. The first is import dependence disguised as rapid modernization. The second is self-reliance reduced to slogans while the armed forces wait for usable capability.

India requires a disciplined middle path: indigenous design where sovereignty is essential, foreign partnership where technology gaps are real, and emergency imports only where delay creates unacceptable operational risk.

By 2035, success should be measured through outcomes. The Air Force should possess sufficient modern squadrons and force multipliers. The Army should field networked formations with long-range precision fires and resilient logistics. The Navy should maintain credible submarine, carrier and maritime-surveillance forces. All three services should operate through shared command systems supported by protected space and cyber infrastructure.

Industry should be able to produce ammunition, missiles, drones, sensors and spare parts at wartime rates. Nuclear forces should remain survivable, secure and under unquestioned civilian control. India’s external partnerships should multiply national power without limiting strategic autonomy.

The ₹7.85 lakh crore defence allocation creates opportunity, not assurance. Money becomes deterrence only when it produces trained personnel, available equipment, stocked magazines, secure networks and commanders who can integrate them under pressure.

India’s defence modernization will succeed when an adversary no longer sees a gap between what New Delhi announces, what Indian industry promises and what the armed forces can deploy. That is the standard for a country seeking to remain sovereign in a two-front, multi-domain and increasingly unforgiving strategic era.

Rajnath Singh

Intelligence Reports & Briefings

India’s Defence Modernization Roadmap: Building Power for a Two-Front Era